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Individuals allocate time between production of goods 
shared by family members and goods consumed only by the 
individual. Individuals are inclined to misbehave by giving 
less time to production of shared goods than is preferred by 
the family. In some cultures, strict family control reduces 
misbehavior. Marriage for love is an innovation in marriage 
contract enforcement adopted by cultures with specific 
characteristics. Analysis of cultures in the Human 
Relations Area Files supports the theory. 
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I. Introduction 
Traditional economic theory treats families as a single 
unit with a combined "household" utility function. More 
recently, economists have recognized that a family can 
usefully be described by assuming each member maximizes an 
individual utility function. 
The seminal contributor to the economic theory of the 
family is Becker (1973, 1974, 1981). Becker exploits the 
notion that individuals can produce and consume more when 
married than when single. Becker then shows how the sorting 
of mates to achieve this increased consumption can be 
modeled as a market. 
Other authors extend Becker's research. Peters (1986) 
looks at factors affecting the costs and benefits of 
divorce. Johnson and Skinner (1986) analyze changes in 
female U.S. labor force participation rates. Boulier and 
Rosenzweig (1984) examine U.S. statistics on education, 
length of life, and other factors influencing marriage and 
household behavior. Grossbard-Shechtman (1984) models 
supply and demand for husbands and wives and predicts 
cultural differences in bridewealth, dowry, age at marriage, 
and labor force participation. Pollak (1985) likens 
marriage to the merger of firms and explores the role of 
transactions costs in family production. 
Some researchers apply game theory to marriage. Manser 
and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) treat 
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marriage as a two-person cooperative game where spouses 
allocate time between private goods, shared goods, and 
leisure. Roth (1984) models mate search, concluding that 
individuals do not gain from misrepresenting themselves. 
Both anthropology and sociology possess substantial and 
mature literatures on marriage. Some researchers from these 
disciplines view marriage in a manner akin to the later 
economists. Blau (1964) introduces the idea that mutual 
exchange is the basis for all social interaction, including 
marriage. In a classic cross-cultural analysis, Levi­
Strauss (1969) shows how the exchange of wives and valuable 
assets cements kinship ties. Goody and Tambiah (1973) 
compile cultural information on bridewealth and dowry. 
Goody (1976) uses the cultural data in the Ethnographic 
Atlas to test hypotheses about family behavior. 
II. A Model of Family Allocation of Time 
The economic theory of marriage introduced by Becker 
assumes individuals can devote a fixed vector of inputs to 
production of household goods inside a marriage or can 
remain single and devote the same fixed vector of inputs to 
production of household goods outside a marriage. 
Individuals marry because the vector of inputs yields more 
joint output in a marriage than the sum of individual 
outputs when single. This output includes "products" like 
companionship and the joys of children. Enforcement of an 
explicit or implicit marriage contract is unimportant in 
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Becker's theory since spouses are assumed to maximize joint 
product and make transfers within the family to provide 
appropriate compensation. 
The model presented in this paper departs from previous 
work by allowing individuals in a marriage to allocate time 
between production of own goods and production of household 
goods. Individuals do not automatically maximize joint 
family output and the family must enforce proper spouse 
behavior in much the same way firms enforce proper worker 
behavior in the face of worker temptation to shirk. 
The possibility of differences between individual and 
family preferences is easiest to see in an arranged 
marriage. Since the marriage occurs without the consent of 
at least one spouse, that spouse's interests are more 
clearly different from the interests of the family than when 
marriage is voluntary. 
Arranged marriage an easy example to use in 
understanding the model. More importantly, arranged 
marriage is common, being the norm in about half of the 
world's cultures. In an additional twenty percent of 
cultures, arranged marriage is an accepted alternative 
(Broude and Greene, 1983). 
Most clearly in an arranged marriage, a family (F) 
chooses to accept a mate (M) if the increase in production 
or utility from doing so exceeds the compensation to the 
mate plus appropriate transaction and enforcement costs. 
Although applied here to arranged marriage, the model is 
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perfectly general. For example, each individual in a 
childless two-person marriage can be considered both 
"family" and "mate". The problem of differences between 
family and individual preferences is also present with 
children and when other relatives live in a household. 
A mate can devote time to production of household goods, 
shared within the household, or can devote time to 
production of own goods, consumed only by the mate, leisure 
being an example of the latter. Household goods (p) are 
produced using inputs of time from both M and F, P=P(~,fp). 
More formally, inputs and outputs are each vectors 
representing the variety of uses of time and the variety of 
value-producing outputs. Positive but diminishing marginal 
products of both time inputs is assumed, as is a diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution between time inputs. 
The function P is measured in some common unit of va~ue. 
Unlike this model, Becker and others (Peters, 1986) use a 
production function where time and other inputs produce 
goods which are then combined into one composite household 
good. The use here of value functions allows time to be 
allocated to both individual and household goods and is 
equivalent to the indirect utility functions used by McElroy 
and Horney (1981) and by Manser and Brown (1980). 
Goods are distributed in the household by changing the 
share of the household good given to family and mate. For 
now, assume the family sets the share. An equivalent 
assumption is to say that the share is set by market forces 
5
 
in a way that maximizes joint family output. The share of 
the household good P allocated to the mate is given by s, 
the remainder of which (l-s) goes to the family. 
For reasons clear later, let share s be a function of 
parameter z which the family actually chooses, s=s(z). s 
has a maximum equal to one (when s'=O, s"<O) and a minimum 
equal to zero (when s'=O, s">O). For convenience, the 
maximum occurs when z=l and the minimum when z=O. 
Production of own goods is a function of individual time 
inputs. Y is the value of goods produced by F for F, 
Y=Y(f y)' and X is the value of goods produced by M for M, 
x=x(mx). Positive but diminishing marginal product is 
assumed for both functions. 
Following the new theory marriage, the interests of the 
family are separate from those of any particular member. 
Since F controls distribution of household good P and 
controls time allocations by M, F maximizes family value 
with respect to z, fiX' ~, f y ' and f p . The family is 
constrained by total time available to M and F and is 
constrained because F must assure that M receives income I 
at least equal to that available in another marriage, 
sP+X~I. If the next best alternative for M is to remain 
single, I=X(M). The cost of divorce and remarriage is not 
explicitly included. Either I is net of these costs or the 
calculation is made before marriage. 




(a) Vf = (l-s)P + Y - Al(~+mx-M) 
- A2(fp+f y-F) + A3(X+SP-I) 
If the compensation constraint I is binding, M receives 
compensation equal to the best alternative and the 
maximization problem is solved using A3>O. The first order 
conditions with respect to z, mx ' and rnp follow: 
The multipliers Al and A2 are the marginal values to F 
of additional time for M and F. A3 is the marginal cost to 
F at equilibrium of an increase in the alternative income 1 
to M. Given that A3>O and since as/az and P are positive, 
condition (b) shows A3 must equal one. The marginal cost to 
F of an increase in I by one dollar is one dollar, the 
amount F's income falls. 
A sufficiently large avf/afp or small avf/afy induces F 
to devote all available time to production of household 
goods; "1 simply have no time to myself." Similar 
conditions make F require M to devote all time to household 
production. Using a different model, Becker (1981) outlines 




Since A3=1, conditions (c) and (d) simplify: 
(e) 
= -1 
The left side of this equation is the slope of an 
isova1ue curve from the function Vf(mx'~' ••' .) = vf 
O, 
holding other independent variables constant. At 
equilibrium, the slope of this functions equals the slope of 
M's time constraint (-1). 
III. Conflicting Incentives 
In the economic theory of the firm, individuals earn 
higher income by allowing themselves to be organized by an 
entrepreneur in a way that reduces otherwise considerable 
transaction costs. Such an arrangement also exploits 
economies of scale and promotes gains from specialization. 
One important restraint on the gain from forming a firm 
is the cost of monitoring and enforcing appropriate behavior 
by workers. Workers have higher income because they are 
organized in firms, but once organized in firms, each worker 
has an incentive to shirk assigned responsibilities and so 
increase individual utility. 
Because a family member only receives a share of the 
output produced with that member's time, the member has 
different preferences than those of the family. If M can 
choose own time allocations freely, M maximizes the 
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following function with respect to mx and~. Since F 
distributes household goods, M takes the share of household 
goods s as given. 
The marginal value to M of additional time for M is A. 
Notice that A is in general not equal to Al from 
maximization for F. The value of MiS time is different for 
M than for F. 





As before, the left side of this equation is the slope 
of an isovalue curve, this time from the function vm(mx'llJ» 
= VmO. Once again, the slope of this function equals the 
slope of M's time constraint (-1). 
This equation would be identical to maximization for F 
were it not for the presence of the share term s in the 
denominator. The equilibrium marginal rate of substitution 
between time inputs is different for M because M receives 
only a share of the household good P. 
M chooses less time for household production tha~ is 
preferred by the family. In order to achieve a slope equal 
to (minus) one in condition (g), the numerator must be 
smaller than for condition (e), implying smaller marginal 
product of own production time and so more time is given to 
own production. Likewise, the marginal product of time for 
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the household must be larger for condition (g) than for (e), 
~o less time is given to household production. Figure 1 . 
compares isovalue graphs for M and F. 
M time for 
own production
(m )x
* vf(mx,mp ' • · .) • V f 
M time for household production (m )p
 
Figure 1. Comparing M and F Choices
 
Note that an isovalue curve for M passing through F's 
equilibrium point A has a slope equal to -s. This is shown 
simply by multiplying both sides of equation (g) by sand 
using the amounts of mx and ~ which maximize value for F. 
As the share given to M approaches one, the difference 
between optimal choices for M and F are reduced (-s gets 
closer to -1). Thus, as the mate's share of household goods 
gets larger, the mate is less tempted to misbehave. If 
household goods are shared equally, members of larger 
households have greater temptation to misbehave. 
Remember that the term "misbehavior" is used here 
without value judgement, only implying behavior different 
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than what the family prefers. Obviously, a mate does not 
view the difference in preferences as misbehavior. 
The difference in time inputs chosen by F for M and 
those chosen by M for M is also influenced by the convexity 
of the isovalue function, the rate at which the marginal 
rate of substitution between time inputs changes. The 
equilibrium for M (point C) is always between points A and B 
in Figure 1. As the isovalue functions become more convex, 
the range of equilibrium points for M, and thus the 
difference between equilibrium points for M and F decreases. 
The important component determining convexity of the 
isovalue function is the degree to which time inputs 
substitute between own and household production. If time 
inputs are easily substituted, the isovalue function is 
relatively flat, and M has relatively greater tendency to 
misbehave. A spouses ability to substitute time inputs 
depends in turn on the family's ability to monitor 
appropriate spouse behavior. For example, if each family 
member possesses specialized skills, other members find 
monitoring appropriate behavior difficult. The same holds 
if much labor takes place outside the household. A clear 
implication here is that family member misbehavior is more 
likely ceteris paribus in technically complex cultures with 
significant labor outside the household. 
The time inputs of M preferred by M are different than 
those preferred by F for any distribution of household goods 
other than giving all of them to M, (s=l). This suggests 
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that M is tempted to misbehave regardless of the agreed 
distribution of household goods. A change in distribution 
(or, for that matter, a fixed payment) cannot be used to 
"bribe" M into behaving properly, although it can be used to 
reduce the temptation to misbehave. Becker's model 
incorrectly assumes transfers among family members can be 
made in a way that assures optimal behavior. The model here 
shows how contractual enforcement rather than side payments 
are necessary in a family. 
How does the family make certain that a mate entering 
the family behaves properly? As mentioned, one method is 
for the family to control the choice of a mate. 
Interestingly, in some cultures, the bridewealth paid at 
marriage is refundable if the wife misbehaves. Since 
bridewealth is usually paid to a number of the wife's blood 
relatives, those relatives try to make the wife behave 
properly to protect the payments (Kottak, 1978). 
Marriage arrangement is only one method employed to 
assure proper behavior, however. Families in some cultures 
completely isolate the wife at horne. Wives of the Pakhtun 
of Pakistan are virtual prisoners (Lindholm and Lindholm, 
1982) and the practice is common in other Islamic cultures. 
Cheung (1972) explains how the Chinese practice of binding 
women's feet is used to reducing the wife's ability to 
produce outside the household. That a wife is often 
isolated in order to prevent sexual misbehavior is 
consistent with this notion. 
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Religion is another tool to enf6rce strict marriage 
contract compliance. The bible encourages good behavior by 
the wife: "As the church is subject to Christ, so let wives 
also be subject to their husbands" (Ephesians, 5:24). The 
Koran is more concise: "Virtuous women are obedient, • " 
(Surah iv. i:-). By implication, cultures with religions 
which actively promote appropriate human behavior need rely 
less on other enforcement methods ceteris paribus. 
IV. Love 
To this point, the model of behavior in a marriage 
treats participants as selfish individuals interested only 
in increased consumption of own and their share of household 
goods. The model shows how this type of self-interest 
causes behavior desired by a family to diverge from that 
preferred by a mate. However, at least in modern western 
countries, couples ideally marry for love rather than simple 
material self-interest. 
The presence of passion or romantic love is widely 
recognized in cultures and throughout history. However, 
love as a primary reason to marry appears only recently in 
history and is relatively uncommon among cultures even in 
the modern era. 
The practice of marriage for love emerges in a limited 
fashion among the upper class in the latter stages of the 
Roman Empire and among some early Christians (Lantz, 1982; 
Goody, 1983:151). The courtly love of the Feudal period is 
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a dramatic form of love but is celibate. Upper class 
Europeans recognize marriage for love beginning in the 
seventeenth century. Although the practice spreads 
gradually to all classes in Europe and to the United States, 
marriage for love dominates western society only by the 
latter nineteenth century (Lantz, 1982). 
Economists acknowledge the presence of love in marriage. 
However, like Peters (1986), most authors assume love is one 
output produced by a married couple. Becker (1981) shows 
how love by the head of a family can convert individual 
maximization to joint household maximization. Becker also 
recognizes the importance of love and caring in reducing the 
cost of enforcing appropriate family member behavior but 
does not outline the specific effects on the temptation to 
misbehave. 
Economists have a simple technique to introduce love and 
caring into individual decision-making. Let the utility of 
M depend in part on the utility of F: Um=Um(own goods, 
household goods, Uf ). Changing the utility function to the 
value (inverse demand) functions used in this model, let 9 
be a function which converts value received by F to value 
received by M. Because value to F increases value to M, a9/ 
avf>o. Given the constraint on M's time, M's maximization 
equation becomes the following: 
Rearrange the implied first order conditions: 
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As before, M equates the marginal rate of substitution 
between time inputs to the slope of the time budget line. 
If M doesn't care about F, as/avf=o and the ratio simplifies 
to that in equation (g). Without love, M is inclined to 
misbehave by devoting less time to household production than 
is preferred by the family. 
By contrast, if M does care for F, the desire by M to 
misbehave is reduced or even eliminated. Consider the case 
where as/aVf=l, that is, where M is indifferent between a 
dollar in value received by M or by F. Becker (1973) terms 
this situation "full caring". The denominator of (i) 
simplifies to aP/3~ and the resulting equilibrium is 
identical to that preferred by F in equation (e). If a mate 
considers own value to be the same as family value, the mate 
has no desire to misbehave. 
"Full" caring is only one case, of course. If Meares 
less than fully about the family, aS/aVf<l. Here M's 
equilibrium response is between no caring and full caring 
since the slope of the equilibrium condition lies between 
those give~by the extreme conditions (e) and (g). The 
desire to misbehave is tempered by love for the family. 
If M considers own value of less importance than family 
value, aS/aVf>l. In this case, M is inclined to misbehave 
by devoting more time to production of household goods 
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(including companionship) than is preferred by F. A curious
 
possibility. Can a lover try too hard to please?
 
Certainly, and the popular media occasionally feature the
 
result in tragic terms.
 
v. Love and Marriage Contract Innovation 
The preceding section highlights the role of love in 
reducing the tendency of family members to misbehave by 
giving too little time to household production. Thus, love 
is an innovation in marriage contract enforcement, a 
substitute to other methods of assuring proper behavior. 
That love and coercion are substitutes is an important 
implication of the theory but is insufficient itself to 
constitute a unique contribution. It is the other 
implications and their application to available cultural 
data that distinguish this research. In particular, the 
model allows an examination of the factors influencing the 
methods employed to enforce implicit marriage contracts. 
Marriage for love seems to be an ideal alternative to 
coercion. Most obviously, marriage for love eliminates any 
monitoring and enforcement costs. Given its obvious 
advantages, why wasn't marriage for love invented earlier? 
Why doesn't marriage for love now dominate all cultures? 
As with contract enforcement in general, the method 
employed to enforce a marriage contract depends on the 
ability to monitor behavior, the temptation to misbehave, 
and the ability to apply coercion or alter incentives. One 
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method used to assure proper behavior in ordinary contracts 
is uncommon in families: direct payment in money or goods. 
In fact, it is precisely because families possess an 
advantage in various non-market enforcement methods that 
they rarely use market alternatives (Pollak, 1985). 
Full love eliminates the temptation to misbehave and so 
makes monitoring and coercion unnecessary. Love is a useful 
tool when monitoring behavior and applying other incentives 
is difficult. For example, when labor skills are 
specialized, family members without those particular 
specialized skills find monitoring more difficult. Also, as 
production moves out of the household, love gains a 
comparative advantage for marriage contract enforcement. 
Marriage for love has costs, however. Search costs are 
higher since emotional compatibility is more difficult to 
find than simple productive skills. Marriage for love a~so 
faces higher decision costs after marriage. In an arranged 
marriage, distribution of household goods is typically made 
by family elders. Marriage for love more often encourages a 
cooperative decision about distribution, although cultural 
rules and religion provide accepted standards. 
VI. Empirical Results 
The hypothesis proposed in this paper is that societies 
promote the method of marriage contract enforcement best 
adapted to available production technology, incentives to 
misbehave, and methods of coercion. In other words, the 
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degree of coercion employed to enforce the marriage contract 
is a function of the ease with which love can be used and 
factors like job specialization, work outside the horne, and 
family organization. 
The Human Relations Area Files provides a unique 
opportunity to test the model. The Human Relations Area 
Files (HRAF) is a comprehensive source of information on 
human culture. The HRAF provides a detailed index and 
system of cross-referencing seven hundred categories of 
information from ethnographies written by anthropologists 
about more than three hundred cultures. 
Some of this textual material has been coded by 
sociologists and anthropologists, the first important 
example being the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967). 
Subsequent researchers have coded material for a subset of 
one hundred eighty-six cultures in the HRAF. The subset .is 
labelled the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample and its cultures 
are chosen according to a variety of criteria including that 
all cultural types be represented, that territories not 
overlap, and that relatively comprehensive information be 
available (Murdock and White, 1969; Lagace, 1977). 
The model implies that the degree of family coercion is 
a decreasing function of the use of marriage for love, a 
decreasing function of specialized labor skills, a 
decreasing function of work outside the household, a 
decreasing function of religious power, and an increasing 
function of family size. Estimates of these variables are 
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available for some of the cultures in the Standard Cross-
Cultural Sample. Refer to the appendix for detailed 
definitions. 
The dependent variable W-ARRANGE indicates the degree to 
which a woman's marriage is arranged by the family. GODS 
indicates the degree to which gods actively intervene in 
society. LOVE indicates the importance of romantic love. 
LOVE does not indicate the importance of conjugal love after 
marriage nor the importance of parental love of children. 
If they emerge at all, these forms of love tend to become 
important sometime after the wedding. MONEY indicates the 
complexity of currency. CRAFTS indicates the degree of 
specialized technical skills. FAMILY indicates the 
complexity of the family structure. 
TABLE 1
 
MULTINOMIAL PROBIT WITH WOMEN'S ARRANGED MARRIAGE
 
LOVE CRAFTS MONEY GODS FAMILY INHERIT n 
(1) -0.26 -0.26 0.24 -0.08 0.02 85 
(4.53) (2.64) (2.70) (1.22) (0.47) · · 
( 2) -0.26 -0.25 0.25 -0.08 · 86• (4.59) (2.60) (2.79) (1.35) · · 
(3) -0.40 -0.26 0.43 -0.12 0.05 -0.49 35 
( 3 .'58) (1.71) (2.71) (1.18) (0.61) (1.64) 
(4) . . . . -0.22 65 . . . . · (1.15)· 
Dependent variable is W-ARRANGE. n is the number 
of observations for which complete data are 
available. Figures in parenthesis are the 
absolute value of the ratio of the coefficient and 
its asymptotic standard deviation, distributed 
normally for large samples. 
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Table 1 summarizes a series of multinomial probit 
equations using coded sees data. Multinomial probit is 
employed rather than mUltiple regression because the 
dependent variable is categorical and not continuous. As 
such, interpretation of the coefficients is awkward. They 
represent changes in the probability of a value for the 
dependent variable for increases in the independent 
variables, where independent variables are measured in 
standard deviations. Of real interest are the signs on the 
coefficients and their asymptotic significance. 
Equations (1) and (2) show that the model's predictions 
are generally confirmed. Arranged marriage and love are 
strong substitutes. Further, an increase in craft 
specialization reduces the importance of arranged marriage. 
Interestingly, arranged marriage and the complexity of 
money are directly related. The development of money is an 
important component of an industrial economy, just the sort 
of economy that favors wage labor outside the household. If 
work takes place outside the household, appropriate behavior 
is difficult for the family to monitor. On the other hand, 
money is easily measured and redistributed within the 
family, so the use of currency makes it easier for families 
to monitor member behavior. Further, the wage labor 
permitted by a well-developed currency means that market 
contracts are being used to monitor worker behavior. The 
market is replacing family enforcement. 
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The results also show that religion is a (weak) 
substitute for family enforcement. Finally, the complexity 
of the family structure does not significantly affect family 
choice of arranged marriage. In the case of family 
complexity, perhaps the difficulty of promoting love in a 
large family is offset by the potential for love to reduce 
monitoring costs with a large versus small family. 
Equations (3) and (4) examine the hypothesis proposed by 
Goody (1976) that arranged marriage for women is in part a 
function of the degree to which women can inherit. Goody 
suggests that when women inherit, the family wishes to 
assert more control over mate choice. Although plausible, 
the data here do not confirm Goody's hypothesis. 
The variable INHERIT measures the degree to which women 
versus men inherit valuable goods or property. The sign of 
the coefficient in equation (3) is the opposite of Goody's 
prediction but only marginally significant. Equation (4) 
isolates the INHERIT variable to increase the number of 
observations. The coefficient still has a negative sign and 
is statistically insignificant. 
A more general view of Goody's hypothesis is also 
explored here. Here arranged marriage for either sex is a 
function of the degree to which they control valuable 
assets, including inheritance. The implied equations would 
also be of interest to researchers who emphasize the 
distribution of men's and women's power in a family, Berk 
(1985) being an example. Here the sex that has control over 
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family activities is less likely to experience arranged 
marriage and the other sex is more likely to experience 
arranged marriage. 
Table 2 presents multinomial probit coefficients with 
the importance of arranged marriage for women and for men as 
independent variables. The dependent variables measure the 
degree to which women versus men inherit, control the 
household f control men's output, control jointly produced 
output, and control women's output. With the exception of 
the variable C-MENWOM, these factors also appear not to 
affect mate choice. In addition, the Goody and "power" 
hypotheses predict opposite signs for this variable in the 
two equations. 
TABLE 2 
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS ABOUT ARRANGED MARRIAGE 
Independent 
Variable INHERIT C-HOUSE 
, 
C-MEN C-MENWOM C-WOMEN n 
( 5) W-ARRANGE -0.09 -0.15 -0.10 -0.74 -0.11 49 
(0.29) (0.61) (0.30) (2.18) (0.36) 
( 6) M-ARRANGE -0.11 -0.39 0.26 -1.17 0.27 51 
(0.38) (1.52) (0.75) (3.33) (0.83) 
n is the number of observations for which complete data 
are available. Figures in parenthesis are the absolute 
value of the ratio of the coefficient and its asymptotic 
standard deviation, distributed normally in large samples. 
The theories of Goody and the "power" researchers imply 
that marriage arrangement for women should substitute for 
marriage arrangement for men, representing two obvious 
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groups who can control valuable assets. The model presented 
in this paper shows how the decision to employ arranged 
marriage is determined largely by factors outside the 
family, factors like production technology and economic 
complexity. As such, the degree of marriage arrangement 
should be similar for both sexes in a given culture. The 
Pearson rank correlation coefficient between W-ARRANGE and 
M-ARRANGE is 0.65 with a standard error of 0.068, confirming 
the model's implication. 
VII. Caveats 
Although the statistical results lend an encouraging 
degree of support to the model, several caveats are in 
order. First, as is often the case, the regression 
variables do not always exactly correspond to measures in 
the theory. FAMILY, for example, measures the complexity of 
the f ..lmily rather than the number of family members. 
A second problem involves the coding process itself. 
Coders read text about a culture and assign a number 
according to some prearranged scheme. Such a process is 
obviously subjective. Some researchers address this problem 
by employing multiple coders, Ellis, Lee, and Petersen 
(1978) being an example. 
A final potential problem, aside from the relatively 
small fraction of culture in the sample for which complete 
data are available, is that the Standard Cross-Cultural 
Sample is not a random sample. As mentioned, cultures are 
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chosen based on other criteria. This is a serious problem 
if the sample is biased in some way. For example, because 
of the emphasis of anthropological research, modern western 
industrial cultures may be underrepresented. 
These problems ought not prevent economics researchers 
from exploiting the Human Relations Area Files. We claim 
our theories apply universally but typically restrict our 
empirical investigation to modern industrial·societies. 
Research like this represents an attempt to redress the 
imbalance. 
VIII. Summary 
The model presented here adapts the theory of marriage 
by allowing a spouse to allocate time between production of 
own goods, consumed by the spouse, and production of 
household goods, shared by family members. Because household 
goods are shared, a spouse is tempted to misbehave by using 
more time for own production than is preferred by the 
family. The temptation to misbehave cannot be eliminated by 
altering shares of household goods or by other transfers. 
The temptation to misbehave is reduced if a spouse 
"cares for" or "loves" the family. Thus, love can be a 
useful method of assuring contractual compliance in a 
marriage. Full caring eliminates misbehavior. 
Regression analysis of variables coded from the Standard 
Cross-Cultural Sample of the Human Relations Area Files 
supports the theory. Arranged marriage and marriage for 
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love are substitutes. Arranged marriage is less likely in 
cultures where technical specialization makes family member 
monitoring more difficult. Because it makes monitoring 
easier and permits market contracting, cultures with a 
complete money system are more likely to promote arranged 
marriage. Religion also reduces the requirement for family 
enforcement. Family complexity has insignificant effect on 
the degree of marriage choice. 
This paper represents a first and important attempt to 
exploit with economic theory the Human Relations Area Files. 
As such, this paper points to any number of areas for future 
research. As one example, empirical tests of the theory of 
marriage would benefit from additional variables coding 
information on love after marriage, the degree of coercion 
enforcing behavior within households, and the nature of work 
within and outside the household. 
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Appendix: VARIABLES USED IN STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Name Source Range Definition 
C-HOUSE (5) 1-4 Which sex controls dwellings? One 
indicates men only. Four indicates 
women only. 
C-MEN (5) 1-4 Which sex controls products of men's 
labor? One indicates men only. Four 
indicates women only. 
C-MENWOM (5) 1-4 Which sex controls products produced 
jointly by men and women? One 
indicates men only, four women only. 
C-WOMEN (5) 1-4 Which sex controls products of women's 
labor? One indicates men only. Four 
indicates women only. 
W-ARRANGE (1) 1-6 Degree to which a woman's marriage is 
arranged. Six indicates parents choose 
partner and woman cannot easily object. 
GODS (2) 2-10 Degree to which gods actively intervene 
in society. Ten indicates active and 
supportive of human morality. 
INHERIT (5) 1-4 Which sex inherits valueable property? 
One indicates men, four women. 
LOVE (2) 2-10 Importance of romantic love. 
indicates very important. 
Ten 
M-ARRANGE (1) 1-6 Degree to which a man's marriage 
arranged. Six indicates parents 
choose partner and man cannot 
easily object. 
is 
MONEY (3) 1-5 Complexity of currency in the economy. 
Five indicates a fully developed. and 
specialized currency. 
CRAFTS (4) 1-5 Degree of craft specialization. Four 
indicates a variety of specialists, 
including smiths, weavers, and potters. 
(1) Broude and Greene, 1983. (2) Ellis, Lee, and Petersen, 
1978. (3) Murdock and Morrow, 1970. (4) Murdock and 
Provost, 1973. (5) Whyte, 1978. 
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